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Abstract 
Modern overlay security mechanisms like Web 
Application Firewalls (WAF) suffer from 
inability to recognize custom high-level 
application logic and data objects, which results 
in low accuracy, high false positives rates, and 
overhelming manual effort for fine tuning. In 
this paper we propose an approach to web 
application modeling for security purposes that 
could help next-generation WAFs to adapt to 
specific web applications, and do it 
automatically whenever possible. We aim at 
creating multi-layer models that adequately 
simulate various aspects of web application 
functionality that are significant for intrusion 
detection and prevention, including request 
parsing and routing, reconstruction of actions 
and data objects, and action interdependencies. 
Keywords: web applications, intrusion 
detection, web application firewalls, functional 
modeling 
1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the problem of 
detecting and preventing intrusions on web 
applications with the help of web application 
firewalls (WAF). This kind of dedicated 
security products evolved from generic 
intrusion detection systems (IDS) as the 
significance of web applications increase, the 
complexity level of the web applications grows, 
and the inadequacy of traditional IDS in 
detecting and protecting against intrusions on 
web applications becomes more recognized.    
Despite there is a plenty of WAFs 
nowdays (both commercial and open source), 
empirical reasearch ([1],	   [2]) has shown that 
such firewalls do not provide satisfactory 
protection from modern intrusions, whereby 
today’s commericial firewalls are currently 
losing out to open source firewalls  ([4], [5]) 
and in some cases companies find themselves 
compelled to develop their own solutions for 
protecting web-applications from scratch ([6]). 
In analyzing today’s web application firewalls, 
the following flaws should be noted that reduce 
their efficiency: 
• today’s versions of commercial WAF’s 
from industry leaders are subject to 
variations of “old” traversing methods 
[1] on the HTTP message parsing level; 
• in any substandard cases, in order for 
the an application to function normally, 
a significant portion of the protection 
mechanisms will have to be switched 
off. Reaching a configuration that 
provides a reasonable level of false 
responses along with protection from at 
least base intrusions (XSS, SQLi) is an 
arduous process that requires a months-
long operation and hundreds of hours of 
man power; 
• there is no protection against a broad 
range of intrusions on application logic 
(including intrusions on authorization 
mechanisms).   
The main reason why today’s web 
application firewalls are unable to effectively 
fight intrusions on web applications is that 
these firewalls perform intrusion detection 
mostly at HTTP protocol level. At the same 
time the web applications development 
technology has long since escaped the bounds 
of a “clean” HTTP: they construct multi-level 
abstractions based on it, and provide 
application authors with the tools to resolve 
typical tasks, such as authentication and session 
support, users authorization, structured data 
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messaging, etc. Developing right behind the 
development of web technologies, firewalls 
have taken ad-hoc routes, adding support for 
separate new technologies (for example, REST 
applications) based on old logic or integrating 
new bundles of signatures in response to the 
publication of new intrusions or traversing 
methods.   
As a result, the way of how WAF 
firewalls understand internals of applications 
and their functioning has proven to be far from 
realistic. In order to resolve this issue, firewalls 
should adapt to each of the applications they 
protect: the level of abstraction must be raised, 
along with complexity growth in web 
application development. The task is even more 
complex since there is no standard protocol for 
structured data exchange between the server 
side of the web application and the client side 
executed in the browser. Thus, each application 
implements its own protocol on top of the 
HTTP that differs from the others both 
syntaxically and semantically.  
 
2. The Problem of Web Applications 
Modeling  
In order to ensure the adequate protection 
of today’s web applications, firewalls should 
primarily raise the level of “understanding” of 
how the protected objects are organized. From a 
formal standpoint, this requires contruction of 
functional models, which adequately and 
properly describe all properties of a web 
application relevant to the task of detecting 
intrusions. In this section we describe the 
requirements for such models – which of the 
web applications functioning aspects 
(properties) should be modelled. 
Conformity (Fitness) 
Expressive power must be sufficient to 
describe a broad class of web applications, 
preserving a balance between the universality 
of the model and the rest of its properties. In 
general, web applications are arbitrary 
programs and an attempt to take into account all 
possible options of their implementation 
inevitably leads to models that are difficult to 
comprehend, computationally complex, and do 
not allow automation.   
The sufficiency of the expressive power 
of a model may not be established in a formal 
fashion. As an alternative, sufficient conformity 
of the model may be declared with the help of:  
• expert evaluation by specialists for the 
development of web applications as well 
as by specialists in web application 
protection analysis; 
• creating models for building web 
applications for widespread frameworks.  
 
Automation possibility  
Our final goal is automation of the web 
application model creation by the overlay 
security application. Otherwise, as we can draw 
from the current experience, expenses for the 
manual creation and maintenance of such 
models outweigh the benefit of the additional 
protection that they provide by several times. 
Furthermore, in cases where building the 
models does require the involvement of an 
operator, the required level of expertise should 
be minimized.  
 
Interpretability 
Despite the need for models creation to be 
automated, the burden of manual analysis and 
correction in selecting the mathematical 
formalisms used in the models should be 
evaluated. Models which follow the “black 
box” principle such as neural networks will 
have a limited practical use since the average 
security analyst can not make any conclusions 
out of typical neural network recognition results 
– why did it classify the object one way or 
another, which specific data parts and values 
caused the anomaly, and so on.   
 
3. Web application functional model 
synthesis  
As we mentioned above, the creation of 
an efficient web application firewall requires 
the development of a web app model that takes 
all relevant aspects of its functioning into 
account. In this paper, we divided the 
modelling aspects into three levels from the 
lowest to the highest abstraction, and only the 
most important aspects will be described in 
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detail. The names of the aspects are written in 
bold.   
 
3.1 Syntax level 
The syntax level is used to model the 
process of selecting a specific web application 
from a multitude of web applications served 
through the given communication channel as 
well as syntactic and structural request parsing.  
The process of selecting a web 
application, as a rule, is based on the domain 
name and port, so, to model this process we 
only need to match the list of corresponding 
pairs (domain name, port) to each web 
application.     
The syntactic and structural parsing 
process transforms “raw” HTTP protocol 
requests into data structures that are used 
immediately in the application logic. This 
parsing can be logically divided into three 
stages: parsing according to HTTP protocol 
specification, framework level parsing, and, 
finally, parsing according to the logic of the 
application itself. The first stage (parsing on the 
HTTP protocol level) is mostly standardized, 
however even on this stage, the firewall should 
differentiate the protocol parsing 
implementation nuances depending on the 
platform used, or otherwise a malicious attacker 
may use these nuances to bypass the protection 
system. More detailed intrusions on protocol 
parsing are investigated in [1].  
In order to illustrate the two levels of 
syntax parsing, we provide an example of a 
body of an HTTP request for an application on 
the framework of Google Web Toolkit:	  
{"F":"org.gonevertical.client.re
questfactory.ApplicationRequestF
actory","I":[{"O":"wKhJ_E4nE3Sau
Zf0i01Lt8p4wEg=","P":[{"R":"1","
C":3,"T":"3cfsL4__f0SXJouPZ4iJV3
_Hzpg="}]}],"O":[{"O":"PERSIST",
"R":"1","C":3,"T":"3cfsL4__f0SXJ
ouPZ4iJV3_Hzpg=","P":{"name":"as
dasd"}}]}  
One can see both structural data specific 
for GWT framework (underlined) and data 
specific for a particular application (in bold) 
present in the structure of the message. 
In order to model the results of HTTP 
request parsing, a tree with noted edges and 
vertices is used, which is built by sequentially 
applying decoding steps. For instance, for the 
request   
GET /json-
import.php?c=0&load%5B%5D=jquery
-core,jquery-
migrate&load%5B%5D=utils&ver=3.8
.2&json={%22firstName%22:%22Иван
%22,%22lastName%22:%22Иванов%22,
%22address%22:{%22postalCode%22:
101101},%22phoneNumbers%22:[%228
12123-1234%22,%22916123-
4567%22]} 
the following parsing tree (see Fig.1) will 
be built by means of sequentially applying three 
steps of decoding.  
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Figure 1. Example of an HTTP request parsing tree  
In order to model the algorithm that the web 
application uses in parsing an arbitrary request, 
a solutions tree is used that describes in what 
order and under what conditions the decoding 
steps are applied (they correspond to the tops of 
the tree). The conditions (the tags of the arcs 
correspond to them) are described in the form 
of predicates over the contents of the operating 
request parsing tree. An example of the 
desicion tree is illustrated below (see Fig.2).   
 
Figure 2. Decision tree for request parsing.  
3.2 Actions level  
On the next abstraction level, the actions level, 
a transition is made from the parsed HTTP 
requests to samples of actions. The possible 
quantity of all the requests to occur on an 
application is truly massive, however all 
legimate requests are merely samples of actions 
envisaged by the logic of the application. The 
quantity of different actions is, as a rule, fairly 
small (around 100 for the most complicated 
applications). The actions may have parameters 
that have, as a rule, a specific domain 
(definition area, type). Thus, any request 
obgliatorily sets an action and a list of its 
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(actual) parameters. The algorithm for selecting 
the action and highlighting its actual parameters 
based on the contents of the request is 
sometimes referred to as routing.  In order to 
efficiently protect a web application, a firewall 
must also complete a transition from requests to 
actions and parameters, which requires a 
routing modeling of the process. To ensure the 
syntaxical validation of the actions’ parameters, 
the WAF must also support the syntaxical 
models of the parameters.  
Based on an analysis of the main methods of 
organizing the routing process in the modern 
frameworks, decision lists are proposed for 
routing modelling, where the logical 
expressions are displayed as predicates over the 
contents of the parsing tree and the result is the 
action used and the addresses of its actual 
parameters in the parsing tree. We will examine 
the routing configuration of a Django based 
web application as an example:   
urlpatterns = [ 
    url(r'^articles/([0-
9]{4})/$', 
'news.views.year_archive'), 
    url(r'^articles/([0-
9]{4})/([0-9]{2})/$', 
'news.views.month_archive')
, 
    url(r'^articles/([0-
9]{4})/([0-9]{2})/([0-
9]+)/$', 
'news.views.article_detail'
), 
] 
The following decision list correspond to the 
example above: 
 
For syntax modeling, we propose to 
differentiate between the following cases (the 
approach follows the scheme presented in [8]): 
1. The parameter type is enumeration. In this 
case, the model is the list of possible 
parameter values.  
2. The parameter corresponds to one of the a 
priori widespread data types (numbers, 
different types of indicators, e-mail 
addresses, phone numbers, etc.). The 
model in this case entails a description of 
the selected type (for example, in the form 
of a regular expression).    
3. The parameter does not correspond to the 
predefined data type, but has a regular 
syntax structure. In this case, we propose to 
use a statistical classifier based on multi-
dimentional normal distribution trained 
with historical data.     
4. The parameter is an arbitrary formatted 
string entered by the user. In this case, the 
definition area of the parameter is 
unlimited and thus there is no way of 
creating meaningful model.    
Thus, having a series of values for a 
parameter over a training period, one can use a 
set of statistical tests to determine which of the 
four cases listed above is abblicable, and train 
the corresponding classifier.   
Predicate Name of Action Parameters 
url.path.1 = articles AND url.path.2 ~= [0-
9]{4} AND url.path.3 ~= [0-9]{2} and 
url.path.4 ~= [0-9]+ 
View News YEAR=url.path.2,  
MONTH=url.path.3,  
ARTICLE_ID=url.path.4 
url.path.1 = articles AND url.path.2 ~= [0-
9]{4} AND url.path.3 ~= [0-9]{2} 
Past Month 
Archive 
YEAR=url.path.2, 
MONTH=url.path.3 
url.path.1 = articles AND url.path.2 ~= [0-
9]{4} 
Past Year Archive  YEAR=url.path.2 
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On the actions level the authentication process 
(including multi-level) is modeled as well as 
the user session implementation. We propose 
to describe these processes in terms of the life 
cycle of the session attributes. For each of these 
attributes we define:  
• the procedure for establishing the values of 
an attribute (for example, the attribute 
“session id” may be set in the Set-Cookie 
header in an HTTP response, a “CSRF 
token” attribute – in the HTTP response 
body, and a “user name” attribute – in the 
successful authentication HTTP request 
body); 
• the procedure for verifying the correctness 
of the values of an attribute transmitted in 
requests. For example, “session id” is 
transmitted in the cookie header in an 
HTTP request and must have a correct 
value for all actions in the non-public part 
of the service, while “CSRF token” is 
transmitted in the csrftoken parameter and 
must have a correct value for all non-
idempotent (changing the condition of the 
application) actions; 
• the procedure for invalidating the values of 
an attribute. For example, after executing 
the “exit” action, all of the values of all the 
attributes operating ealier are invalidated.   
 
3.3 Use cases level 
At the use cases level we analyse the logically 
dependend action chains – use cases. In order to 
model the use cases, a firewall must have the 
ability to describe dependencies between 
actions, both data dependencies (action B must 
operate based on the results of action A) and 
time dependencies (action B may be exucted 
only after action A is executed first). 
In order to model the time 
dependencies, we propose to use finite state 
automata. Data dependency models for one of 
today’s online banking systems are illustrated 
below (see Fig.3).
  
 
Figure 3. Modeling dependencies between actions  
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This model describes a system where 
initially access is only allowed to the start page 
(View index), then after entering user 
credentials (Password auth) and completing key 
authorization (Token auth) the user gets the 
opportunity to view data for the account (View 
account). To complete a transfer (Transfer 
funds), the user will also be required to enter an 
additional text code.  
Also on the use cases level we perform 
a data objects reconstruction for learning data 
objects web application operates with (in the 
terms of its logic – for example: accounts, 
messages, user profiles, etc.). Additionally, the 
data object life cycle whould be defined: which 
actions correspond to the creation, viewing, 
modification, and removal of a certain type of 
object. 
On the same level, the modeling process 
of access control takes place as well, the 
dynamic definition of a multitude of samples of 
actions permitted for users at each moment in 
time. In order to do so,  we propose to analyze 
the contents of pages that the web server gives 
to one user or other and derive from them a list 
of actions that may be activated from the pages 
(envisaged by the user’s interface), like in [9].   
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we analysed the aspects of web 
applications functioning from the perspective of 
security enforcement with the web application 
firewall. We proposed modeling principles of 
indicated aspects making it possible to create a 
functional model of an application and identify 
abnormal requests in traffic that run counter to 
the constructed model. The approaches used for 
modeling the properties of web applications 
allow automation with training on network 
data, however a description of the automation 
itself escapes beyond the bounds of this article. 
Both manual and automatic reconstruction of 
web application aspect model would allow 
WAF to adapt to the specific protected web 
application and dramatically improve it’s 
accuracy.  
Additional research requires modeling 
interaction between different web applications 
within the bounds of complex ecosystems (for 
example, “single entry point” technology”, 
Sigle Sign-On). Also, a promising trend is the 
creation of user behavior models of applications 
to identify incidents of theft or illegal use of 
user credentials.   
Functional modeling of web 
applications and taking all of its relevant 
properties into consideration is a necessity in 
creating efficient firewalls for today’s web 
applications.  
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